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The following paper offers a reconstruction of Vichian ideas in order to offer a 
substantial and significant contribution to debates over political legitimacy in the current climate 
of political liberalism and the problem of the universalisation or objectivity of liberal values.  The 
two, Vichian, axes of a normative social thesis would be characterised as the claim that a society, 
characterised as a web of meanings, values and concepts, is legitimate if (1) it can justify its 
institutions and practices to its own members in terms of publicly shared values; and (2) can also 
demonstrate that the institutions and practices do not violate the basic needs which ground the 
invention of all human societies. 
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Vichian normative political theory: history and human nature 
1| The relevance of Vico 
What I propose in the following paper is a reconstruction of Vico’s normative 
political theory.  I call it a reconstruction in order to avoid the unnecessary 
entanglements of the deeper interpretative claim that this reading is consistent with 
Vico’s own ideas.  Such an investigation, if undoubtedly interesting, would have to decide 
to what extent Vico is merely doing political sociology and to what extent he is involved 
in normative political science and also whether what will be claimed below coheres with 
the accepted interpretations of his thought or show where these others have erred.  And 
such questions are better suited to a different intellectual forum.1  In talking of a 
reconstruction rather than an interpretation, I am freed to discuss what, in his writings, is 
most pertinent and salient to contemporary political philosophy.  For Vichian thought, I 
contend, can make a substantial and significant contribution to debates over political 
legitimacy in the current climate of a confused and unsure liberalism; that is, the problem 
of the universalisation or objectivity of liberal values.2 
The main attraction of liberalism is its secular nature.  Not only is it agnostic and 
indifferent to the supposed authority of religion, it also systematically ignores the 
putative normative commitments that arise from one’s history, culture and tradition in 
order to prescribe universal values for all men, at all times and in all places.  And these 
values ground the legitimacy of institutions and laws: when the citizen asks why he or she 
ought to obey his or her government or obey a specific law, certain values belonging to 
public culture can be offered to justify the policy or action and these values embody 
substantive commitments. Liberalism’s supposed advantage over other political theories, 
especially in its traditional form, is clearly seen by the fact that the grounding political 
theory will support and promote the public values since they coincide; that is, laws are to 
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be justified by those values which our society finds rational (liberty, equality) because 
these values are either objectively true (realism), the most rational (coherentism) or the 
most reasonable (constructivism) and not just because they belong to the public political 
culture.  If human beings are able to use their reason free from coercion, then they would 
accept the political values of liberalism as true and its vision of society as just and fair.  
These political values are universal moral values which exist independently of any 
particular society and can measure the justness of a particular institution, policy or 
practice.  Religion, history and culture are a hindrance to free reasoning and ought to be 
removed from rational political debate. 
However, such a robust statement of liberalism is contemporarily rare.  The most 
vociferous opponents of liberalism’s claim to universal legitimacy are adherents of the 
social thesis, which include Aristotelian naturalists, Hegelians, communitarians, 
conservatives and postmodern theorists. (MacIntyre, 1985; Hegel, 1991; Taylor, 1977;  
Sandel, 1998; Walzer, 1987; Burke, 1987; Foucault, 1989)  The social thesis can be 
descriptively characterised as the claim that the individual subject is only who he (or she) 
is by virtue of the society and tradition which brought him into being and which 
maintains and promotes his identity.  The values he holds dear and which justify political 
institutions and arrangements are themselves products of, rather than the basis for, his 
community.  In other words, reason giving is a social activity internal to a specific 
community or way of life.  Put like this, the social thesis is a purely descriptive 
sociological claim and is to be proven true or false by empirical research.   
The social thesis questions the claim that liberal values are universal.  Like all 
values, it seems to contend, they are legitimate only for those agents brought up in a 
liberal tradition.  Here, though, the adherents of the social thesis all go their separate 
ways: postmodernists would hold that this is a merely descriptive claim and that is the 
best one can hope for (Foucault, 1989); some communitarians would claim that this error 
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distorts our moral and interpersonal relations and society ought to be based on other 
values (MacIntyre, 1985); and conservatives would hold that liberal values are not 
justified in the terms that liberalism supposes, but due to the history and tradition which 
brought them into being (Burke, 1987; Hegel, 1991; Taylor, 1977).  What interests me 
most strongly in this discussion is that there exists a problem for adherents of the social 
thesis who pursue any normative agenda, a problem which faces the most conservative 
forms of communitarianism through to the most radical forms of postmodernism; a 
problem which calls into question their worth as “critique” and the value of them as a 
basis for the evaluation of current political and social systems. 
If the social thesis is merely a descriptive sociological claim, then critique 
becomes nothing more than a game and resistance is nothing more than a Nietzschean 
transvaluation of values (without the celebration of the new value of the aesthetic or the 
creative).  The values of liberty, et al reflect only linguistic systems or power structures 
which dominate our way of thinking which is itself no more than an historical 
contingency. Postmodern or contextualist critiques simply state that the values of public 
political culture are justified in so far as they belong to the tradition or way of life.  And 
different ways of life will have different values.  However, this makes the ground of 
political critique or resistance impossible: if there are no independent, objective values 
from which one can judge the basic structure of society or its particular laws, how is 
legitimate resistance or civil disobedience possible?  How can one judge the practices of 
other societies as immoral or unethical?  And though such questions may seem misplaced 
when one seeks to decide how one ought to live in abstract terms, certain social practices 
demand an evaluative response; practices as extreme as female circumcision and human 
sacrifice as well as those as subtle as the distribution of group and gender rights.  One 
needs to be able to normatively say that it ought to be thus and so, not just that it is thus 
and so.   
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Alternatively, if the social thesis expresses normative commitments, then one can 
say that such and such a society does (or does not) make worthwhile and valuable lives 
possible or instantiates certain worthwhile values.  But such normative commitments will 
have to be justified by an appeal to a metaphysical system, whether this be an account of 
human nature (MacIntyre, 1985; Taylor, 1977); or the idea of rational history (Hegel, 
1991).  Yet, any such metaphysical system will be controversial and it would be a 
dangerous basis on which to build resistance to a political order unless one were assured 
of either its objective truth or, at least, homogeneous agreement amongst fellow citizens.  
Oddly, it seems, the vociferous critiques of the metaphysical foundations of liberalism 
are grounded in a far more controversial metaphysical system. 
In this paper, I wish to interrogate whether it is possible to take a normative 
version of the social thesis seriously without relying on a controversial metaphysical 
doctrine.  I shall concentrate on the problem of political legitimacy that confronts any 
thinker who is committed to the social thesis: if one denies the universal point of view 
and rejects the idea of values prior to and independent of society, it is difficult to imagine 
how the laws, policies and institutions of the state can be legitimated to the individual 
and such a stance seemingly leaves no moral space for protest and disobedience in the 
face of one's own values nor the possibility of a social critique of others' values and 
institutions.  However, one possibility resides in Vico’s attempt to write a new science for 
historical studies taking seriously the assumption that knowledge is, at bottom, an 
historical, expressivist and pragmatist phenomenon.  By demonstrating that Vico offers a 
sociology consistent with the social thesis, I hope to show how his thought both requires 
and makes possible a normative element; that is a communitarian account of political 
reflection derived from Vico’s historicism and his critique of social contract theory which 
avoids the charges of irrationalism and conservatism often put to adherents of the social 
thesis. 
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2| The basic postulations of Vico’s philosophical position 
There are explicit counter-enlightenment features at the heart of Vico’s enterprise 
which puts his account immediately at odds with liberalism. First, he rejects the 
epistemological priority of first-person experience and, second, he dismisses the 
erroneous idea of ethical universality.  If one generalises the grounding assumptions of 
liberalism as the notions of a universal, transparent knowing subject (the individual agent 
is in the best position to describe what he wants and why he wants it) and the doctrine of 
moral universalism, then Vico’s attack on Cartesian epistemology and the ethical theories 
of natural law and social contract clearly illustrate his opposition to the prevalent 
rationalism of his time.  Yet he simultaneously sought to offer a new way of knowing 
(science) for the study of history, society and politics.   The fundamental claim made by 
Vico in the pages of the New Science is that, contrary to the “new critical philosophy” of 
Cartesianism, history (or philology as Vico was to term it) and the study of societal 
change (ideal eternal history) is a science with its own principles and methods.  Implicitly, 
his claim is more robust: historical knowledge is privileged over and above the other 
sciences. 
As I have earlier stressed, this paper proposes a reconstruction of Vichian 
thought and so I shall begin by listing, at the risk of anachronism, the major aspects of 
his philosophical position characterised in contemporary language with only minimal 
referential support.  The significant features are: (1) the rejection of metaphysical realism; 
(2) epistemic anti-realism; and (3) moral anti-realism.  And it is these three features which 
ground the theoretical commitment to the social thesis. 
(1) The first claim I want to make about Vico is that he rejects metaphysical 
realism and the correspondence theory of truth.  Vico’s opposition to the Cartesianism 
of his own time was not an expression of anti-scientism but the implicit embodiment of 
a central distinction between two orders of knowledge: la vera (the intelligible) and il certo 
- 7 - 
(the certain).3  The Cartesians had adopted one method and if a discipline could not be 
rendered intelligible following a simple, deductive, rationalist approach, then it was not to 
be considered a branch of knowledge.  Yet any approach that posits immediacy and 
transparency as the dual criteria of knowledge poses a problem for Vico who had 
recognised that the proper and rigorous investigation of historical documents (myth, 
primitive religions and first-hand accounts) demanded that the inquirer put aside his 
immediate grasp of the words and concepts encountered in these documents.  It would 
be an error to assume that the witnesses of the time would be using language and 
concepts in a way identical with the immediate use that the historian would understand.4  
So, in the discourse of history, the aim is not the clarity of certainty but the ideal of 
intelligibility. 
And this movement away from immediacy to intelligibility was grounded in a 
very pre-modern understanding of cause.  Insofar as the knowing subject produces 
something, he can know the “causes” of it. “Causes” is to be understood in a broader 
sense than the modern scientific over-determination of it as the cause-effect relationship.  
Vico tells us that “… if the truth is what is made, to prove [the truth] by means of causes 
is the same as to effect [it].” (AWI 64)5  For Vico, cause includes form and matter in 
physics, purpose in ethics, teleology in metaphysics, and, most notably, explanation in 
geometry whereby if a conclusion is deduced from a syllogism, the two premises “cause” 
the conclusion. (Caporali, 1992, 58-59)  To explain something is to give a full account of 
it in terms of all the axes of causes, and this account, even if not a modern cause-effect 
relationship, causes it to be the case.  
A full explanation, that is the making intelligible of a phenomenon or object 
rather than immediately knowing it, requires the full description of its causes and this is 
only possible with a certain subset of phenomena.  Vico holds that only those things 
which are created by man can be rendered intelligible through the articulation of their 
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causes.  Thus, mathematical knowledge and geometry can be known with certainty 
because the system, concepts and connections between them were invented and not 
discovered.  And, more fundamentally as we shall see, they were invented for a reason.  
As Vico would put it at the beginning of his intellectual odyssey: “We demonstrate 
geometrical truths because we make them; if we could demonstrate physical things we 
would make them.” (MCS, p. 41)  Thus, the human is able to render mathematics and 
geometry intelligible, but not physics because nature was not made by man so a full set of 
causes (most notably, the purpose) is always going to be beyond his or her ken. 
(2) Vico is an anti-realist about knowledge claims and, more specifically, 
epistemic assertions are an expression of an historical worldview and their truth is 
measured by whether they cohere or not with the foundational categories of that 
worldview.  The exact nature of his anti-realism is not, however, explicit and seems to be 
an expressivism when we talk about humans in historically young ages, growing into a 
pragmatism and, finally, when knowledge takes on the semblance of rationality in the 
later stages of civilisation, his anti-realism consists in a coherentist position.  His anti-
realism is grounded in the verum-factum principle or the theory of maker’s knowledge 
which identifies knowing with making.  The assumption of the verum-factum principle 
clearly sets Vico’s position in opposition to Descartes’s rationalist project.6  Physics is an 
imperfect knowledge because the full lists of causes, which, for Vico, must include the 
“why” and the ultimate explanation, is just not available to the human mind since it was 
not created by human activity.  Vico clearly distinguishes between what is intelligible 
(deductions derived from artificial concepts forming a coherent system of meaning) and 
what can only be described (things which are not made by man: nature, matter, et cetera).  
The division of knowledge into two distinct orders severely challenges Descartes’ 
rationalist assumption that human reason is adapted and adequate to accurately represent 
reality in epistemological terms, since the very basis of such a system – mathematical, 
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geometrical and analytical truths – requires that truths discovered by reason inhere in 
reality.  Vico stated openly that reason does not discover such truths, but invents them.  
What the human being can know certainly is not what corresponds or is, in some way, 
related to an independent reality, but instead what is consistent with and coheres with 
those invented, seemingly axiomatic concepts which make knowledge possible. 
The invented concepts and categories that make a phenomenon intelligible are 
not transcendental or universal, but historical and history is the science which will give 
the inquirer a full explanation of the wherefore of the categories by which a certain agent 
experiences and articulates the world.  Vico identifies the concepts of human knowledge 
as historical and arbitrary expressions of an emotional relationship between the human 
being and the world. Knowledge is made possible by categories that are produced by a 
specific social and cultural tradition.   
Vico proposes a particular human faculty, that of ingenuity.  Ingenuity is the 
power to create “imaginative universals”, that is the faculty of the human mind that 
creates concepts which make experience possible.  And these concepts are intelligible in 
the sense that they express the necessary desire on the part of human beings to order the 
world which faces them in response to fear and need.  So, the purposes of a worldview, 
embodied in a people’s myths, metaphysics and ethics, can be known.  A people 
produces its worldview through an expression of mythopoeic creation and such a system 
of knowledge is, at first, pragmatic: the world is ordered to facilitate the satisfaction of 
desires, to overcome the insecurities of fear and shame and such an ordering gives rise to 
new behaviours, roles and concepts. (NS1 ¶24) 
However, imaginative universals should not be equated with rational concepts; 
they are the possibility of knowledge because they express the first man’s expression of 
fear and shame in the face of the world.  Man’s initial relationship to reality is emotional 
and not epistemological.  The sophisticated reason we celebrate today has its roots in 
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myth and poetry as the first attempt to explain the world and gain dominance over 
reality.  So, knowledge is, at base, pragmatic: the world is ordered to facilitate the 
satisfaction of interests (most notably, firstly, to eliminate fear and, secondly, shame) and 
this ordering gives rise to new values, motivations and aims.  The primitive expressions 
of the first human beings originated the “credible impossible”, or the invented, social 
realm of knowledge.  For Vico, ingenuity and imagination create “credible impossibles”, 
or open up the possibility to attempt a description of reality which is necessarily beyond 
the ken of the human.  Once in place, pragmatism gives way to coherentism and men's 
reason tries to systematise and refine these basic concepts into a total representation of 
reality. 
Knowledge is produced by myth and sophisticated reason has its origin in the 
institutions and history which gave rise to its concepts and lexicon.  If we forget the 
historical becoming of concepts, we commit the “conceit of scholars” where the mind 
judges what is unknown to it in terms of what is familiar.  Such unreflective, immediate 
epistemic grasp of a phenomenon leads to inaccurate and approximate knowledge of the 
beliefs, ideas and desires of historically and culturally different human beings.  Hence, the 
need for philology or an historical account of the emergence of meaning.  Truth does not 
describe some metaphysical reality, but rather the way of life that makes knowledge and 
ethics possible. 
(3) Not surprisingly, Vico is also a moral anti-realist and, for him, ethical 
assertions are expressions of values and obligations determined by the social structure 
one inhabits.  The rationality of moral statements amounts to, once more, their 
coherence or incoherence within the systems of social meanings, values and norms.  The 
discourse of history and specific knowledge of civil institutions can be rendered 
intelligible, in a way that physics never can, because the grounding concepts that 
structure such knowledge have an origin in the minds of humans, their passions and their 
- 11 - 
needs. 
Vico’s general criticism of natural law theory is consistent with his claim that 
there is a non-rational birth to human society.  He attacks the ahistorical account of 
natural law and its idea of universal law accessible to all rational beings. (His criticism is 
directly aimed at Epicurus, Plato, Selden, Pufendrof and Grotius, and indirectly at 
Hobbes.)  It is a mistake to think that the laws of the thinkers’ own time can be adequate 
for earlier ages.  So any political system which is derived from a set of principles 
concerning the immutable nature of the human being is erroneous because there is no 
such essence of the human being.  The human being as subject of law and morality is 
created and produced by those institutions, ideas and conceptions of the good found in 
his time and not externally in some platonic or scientific realm.  The metaphysical error – 
"the conceit of scholars" – by which philosophers project their own constitution on the 
past and assume that men of different societies and epochs are basically the same has 
infected work in political and moral theory form the Epicureans and the Stoics to 
theories of natural law. (NS1 ¶¶12-20; NS3 ¶¶120-131, 309-329)   
However, Vico’s principal target is social contract theorists who make three 
cardinal errors: one, they assume that men in the past thought using the same concepts 
and desired the same ends as we do: “For the philosophers have meditated upon a 
human nature already civilised by the religions and laws, in which, and only in which, 
philosophers originated;”. (NS1 ¶23) Two, the theorists claim that civilisation began with 
a contract, yet contract making requires advanced and sophisticated social practices.  In 
order to make a contract, a whole host of institutional and moral practices must already 
be in place.  And, three, the theorists are unable to distinguish what is common to all 
men and what is contingent to this particular social embodiment of the human being.  To 
make natural law prior to and the basis of customary law is to turn things upside down: 
laws partly arise from the particularities and contingencies of the origins of society and 
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find their basis in the barbarism of peoples.  Natural law is nothing but the sophistication 
and refinement of customary law, but one must never forget its ‘lowly’ origin in order to 
fully understand it. (NS1 ¶¶19-22)  In other words, the enquirer take laws and 
conventions that were invented and are produced by society as the foundation of society 
and therefore turn the proper explanation on its head.  (NS3 ¶¶122, 127, 666, 668) 
In summary, then, the laws of society arise from the emotions and from custom 
and not from reason.  The understanding of one’s world and also one’s roles and 
responsibilities is a product of culture and history.  And both epistemic and moral 
assertions are either expressions of an emotional relationship with one’s surroundings or 
meaningful only if they cohere with the concepts that develop from this primordial 
ground.  Such a characterisation of Vico’s thought replicates and theoretically reinforces 
the principal claim of the social thesis.  However, even though Vico rejects the knowing 
subject which is central to modern epistemology and also moral universalism derived 
from the rationality of man, he does not commit himself to a hopeless and self-refuting 
relativistic position.  Already, there is minimal rationality: both epistemic assertions and 
moral assertions are true if they cohere with the categories of a specific society and its 
central values, meanings and norms.  Knowledge is still possible, but one needs a new 
science and a new method in order to achieve it.  All the sciences, disciplines of 
knowledge and arts have arisen from the social existence of the human being, but that 
does not mean that one cannot understand their causes or explain them.  They were 
made by humans and hence we can offer a full explanation of the why and how of the 
existence of our epistemological, metaphysical and ethical doctrines as long as we 
remember that they do not correspond to reality, but are, in fact, made possible by the 
social institutions, practices and languages which gave birth to them.  Vico’s aim is to 
identify those constraints and the form that such societies take.  One ought not to look 
for universal values or a universal account of human nature, but universal requirements 
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for a group of human beings to be characterised as a society.  And these universal 
requirements will delineate the form, rather than the substance, that knowledge and 
ethics will take.  It is this formal universality at the ground of all human endeavour, 
knowledge and creation which makes possible political, ethical and epistemological 
systems and may offer a possibility to ground normative commitments consistent with 
the social thesis. 
3| The philological-philosophical method 
Vico’s New Science is the postulation of the principles of proper historical enquiry 
and it will elevate historical knowledge above and prior to any metaphysical, logical or 
ethical knowledge.  The method he will employ is twofold: philological, or historical, and 
philosophical.  The former is the attempt to avoid what Vico saw as the error of his 
predecessors, that is the “conceit of scholars”, or the conflation of how we see the world 
given our historical, social existence and how the world actually is.  To explain 
something, to know it, is to realise that it is a production of men’s minds and its ultimate 
cause is to be located there.  In order to make manifest the how, the why as well as the 
what of an event or an idea, one must reveal its origins in those institutions and primitive 
ideas which make it possible.   
Therefore, Vico will begin with a philological or historical investigation which 
will draw out the truth hidden in the fables, myths and primitive religions of a people.  
He will not treat these as mere superstition or false knowledge, but as embodiments of 
the metaphysics and theology, the logic, the morals, economics and the politics of a 
people.  In short, he will firstly lay bare their worldview since it is in relation to this that 
their ideas and practices will find their ultimate justification.  It is this philological 
approach which is contrary to the principles of Cartesianism and natural law theory since 
the enquirer must “… descend from these human and refined natures of ours to those 
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quite wild and savage natures, which we cannot at all imagine and can comprehend only 
with great effort.” (NS3 ¶338)  The philological aspect of Vico’s method highlights the 
mythical and poetic origin of knowledge and morality in the primitive metaphysics and 
theologies of earlier civilisations.  It reveals that modern knowledge systems employ 
concepts produced non-rationally in worldviews that sought to order and make sense of 
the world. 
Yet, his enterprise will also be philosophical, but not in the sense that it should 
be concerned with metaphysical reality as that is beyond the scope of human knowledge 
and it is conceit on the part of the scholar to assume otherwise.  Instead, the 
philosophical element of his enquiry consists in abstracting from our nature those 
elements we share with our ancestors, in order to discover those conditions which must 
be in place for an historical and social human being to exist. (NS3 ¶332)  The social critic 
can observe, in the customs and languages of society, the human choices and motivations 
which gave rise to society in the first place.  Vico’s new science should carve away the 
contingent social existence of man from the necessary way in which man must exist in 
order to be a knowing and ethical subject.  His method is, then, hermeneuticalal.  Social 
meanings and frameworks constitute the ground from which the social critic can 
interpret behaviour and are necessary for an appropriate description of an historical 
agent’s intentions and actions.  To start from the assumption that human beings are 
universally the same all the way down is an error: history and society constitute an agent’s 
identity.  To understand the actions of agents, one must first understand the possible 
range of motivations available to them and these possibilities will be determined by social 
and historical location.  (Skinner, 1974; Gadamer, 1993)  So, not only does Vico’s 
thought embody substantial non-modern claims, his methodological approach is also 
explicitly at odds with the dominant scientific rationalism of his time. 
If Vico can discover fundamental ideas which are universal to all ways of life, 
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then he may be able to say something about that which makes worldviews possible: 
“Uniform ideas originating among entire peoples, unknown to each other must have a 
common ground of truth.” (NS3 ¶144)  What, then, are the uniform ideas one discovers 
embodied in all institutions and civil societies no matter their geographical or temporal 
location?  Vico identifies three institutions necessary for social existence: first, religion, 
for civilisation and knowledge has to arise from the attempt to explain the cause of 
reality. (NS1 ¶8)  There is a storm, a flood, a drought because the spirits are angry; there 
is an abundant harvest because the spirits are merciful.  It becomes possible to offer 
primitive explanations of the events and occurrences of everyday life in terms of a 
coherent system.  However, nothing substantial can be deduced about the content of 
religions, their hierarchy of goods, the roles and obligations of their disciples.  All of that 
remains a philological (particular) enquiry and not a philosophical (universal) one.  So, 
for example, the new science will reveal that societies will be unified by an understating 
of the world about them in terms of the seasons of their geographical location.  Religion, 
at base, expresses this symbiotic relationship between the society and its means of 
subsistence and such agricultural rituals will determine the form, but not the substantial 
content, of a religion.  (One can easily talk of the history of the Christianisation of 
Paganism, and how the rituals move from expressive, to pragmatic and finally “rational” 
status.)  The content of the religion forms the basis of one’s metaphysical worldview and 
furnishes a society with the concepts that will later be abstracted and refined into a 
science proper. 
The second universal institution, marriage, sets up a household and the 
economics of later institutions.  It frees the human from the binding desires of hunger 
and sexual need.  Finally, respect for the dead is universal to every human society.  It is 
true that Vico always talks about the burial of the dead as universal – strangely since he 
was so intimately knowledgeable of classical myth and poetry – but he makes clear what 
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the underlying principle of such a ritual is when he states: “Nor, finally, has there been 
any nation, however barbaric, in which the unburied corpses of its members have been 
left to rot above ground, for such would be a nefarious state, i.e. a state sinning against 
the common nature of men.” (NS1 ¶10)  The ritual itself is not the significant point, it is 
the proper, human respect paid to the dead; that is, the simultaneous recognition of 
death in another and that the other was like oneself.   
Humans act upon principles which regulate action over and above mere survival 
and these three institutions capture the historical moment when the human being as 
opposed to the animal emerges and creates a symbolic, meaningful world which is a 
reflection of his expressive nature.  It opens the possibility of both a (necessarily fictional 
if understood as realism) metaphysical description of the world and an ethical system of 
normative rules: one ought to obey the Gods, to provide for one’s family and to respect 
the dead. (NS1 ¶10; NS3 ¶¶7-13)  These are the formal conditions of society and identity, 
of being recognised as human, but one can say nothing, without philological research, 
about what the Gods command, what goods should be provided to your family and how 
to respect one’s dead. 
Vico, on the basis of his identification of social as opposed to brute existence, 
recognises a significant capacity of the human being that make this social existence 
possible: common sense.  Furthermore, all nations express common sense which forms 
the origin of law in unreflective obligation: “Common sense is judgement without 
reflection, shared by an entire class, an entire people, an entire nation, or the entire 
human race.” (NS3 ¶142)  So, if all men have the power of ingenuity to form those 
concepts that will provide the basis for institutions and all men share common sense, or 
a shared, unreflective disposition for law, then those institutions which embody ideas 
universal amongst all men may reveal a ground common to all men. (NS1 ¶9)  Note here 
that there is also a common sense not only applicable to a peculiar society, but to men as 
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a whole.  The philological and philosophical investigation of social and civil institutions 
will disclose what must be the origins of history and humanity; that is, the moment when 
history and civilisation began. (NS3 ¶338) 
Vico’s New Science is interested in two related questions: how does human history 
arise and what is the original function of the imaginative, created world of metaphysics?  
History is made possible by the emergence of society and society itself arises by men's 
universal disposition to law (although the content of law is variable), the systemising of 
reality into a symbolic and meaningful whole in order to have power over it and a 
universal natural disposition to social relationships.  The world of metaphysics arises 
from the refinement of religion with its roots in explanatory animism and allows men to 
channel and systemise their desires and exert control over reality. 
4| Possible reconstruction of a Vichian normative theory 1: 
historical appropriateness 
The consideration of Vico’s thought so far offers an account of the descriptive 
aspect of the social thesis: liberalism is in error because it conflates the particular social 
constitution of the human being with the universal essence of the human being.  
Therefore, normative judgements derived from this basis will repeat this error.  
Adherents of the social thesis who wish to offer a normative political theory based in an 
Aristotelian account of human nature also commit the same error: if a society is to be 
just or legitimate it must make certain types of life possible and unjust or illegitimate 
societies, contrarily, obstruct worthwhile types of life.  (MacIntyre, 1985; Taylor, 1977)  
Yet, in order to justify such a normative element, the account of human nature requires a 
full metaphysical explanation, which given the exposition of Vichian thought so far 
offered, can be nothing but controversial (a product of the social processes that brought 
it into being). 
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How, if this avenue is presently closed, is it possible to offer a normative ground 
for social critique and evaluation on the basis of Vichian thought?  In the first edition of 
the New Science, Vico comments that all the sciences, disciplines and arts have arisen from 
the origins of humanity, through a process of refinement and sophistication (though, be 
careful not to confuse this with progress as we understand it).  His new science will 
describe the stages (ideal eternal history) through which a society passes in order to reach 
modern, democratic civilization and the abstract concepts of philosophy and the order of 
natural science.  These refined and sophisticated concepts are derived from and 
dependent on the primitive societies which ground on our own and to forget this will 
precipitate a fall into error (as the natural law theorists did).  Vico’s hermeneuticalal 
method is the method with which one can understand (both geographically and 
temporally) distant cultures and through understanding them, comprehend ourselves that 
bit better, but it seemingly cannot form the basis of an evaluative critique.7   
Over and above a philological method to show the origin of particular social 
structures in languages and ways of life, Vico’s new science also offers a philosophical 
method which reveals regularities in the rise and fall of societies; a philosophical 
narration of history.  Could the ideal eternal history form the basis of an evaluative 
critique of social arrangements, institutions and practices?  Could one say, superficially 
and colloquially, that these values (liberty, equality) are or are not apt for a specific 
historical stage and other values (honour, filial ties) are or are not the standards by which 
social structures ought to be evaluated? 
Let us firstly determine exactly what type of philosophy of history Vico is actually 
offering and, for simplicity, let us consider three possibilities: metaphysical history, 
empirical history and hermeneutical history.  What follows does, unfortunately, suffer 
from broad stroke syndrome, but it will allow a better understanding of Vico's position.  
First, metaphysical philosophy of history, perhaps best instantiated in a certain 
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interpretation of Hegelian thought, is either rationalist or theological and its method 
normally deductive. (Hegel, 1990)  One need only fix the ultimate end of history and 
those rules that govern it to be able to describe the phases through which the beliefs, 
civilisations and institutions of men must pass and one can quite easily do so from the 
armchair of one's own home.  This cannot be Vico’s position for two reasons.  First, 
such a rationalist approach to history rests upon an assumption of progress characteristic 
of the Enlightenment. (Mendelbaum, 1971)  Hegel, for example, held that the stages of 
history were determined by the progress of Spirit, but this leads to a counter-intuitive 
consequence: the evils of history are ultimately justified since they bring about progress.  
Individuals, to put it rhetorically, are mere grist to the mill of Spirit.  (Hegel, 1991, §340)  
Vico is thoroughly counter-Enlightenment: there is a sequence of ages, but no progress 
from one to another, merely change.  And second, Vico continually uses empirical 
evidence: he makes recourse to contemporary documents, and – more significantly – he 
holds that historical knowledge yields new facts unattainable to reason alone.   
However, his approach to history is not empirical like that of a Hobbes or a 
Locke and, further, it cannot be since the facts drawn from the past need to be worked 
over if the historian is not to misappropriate and misinterpret them.  The conceit of 
scholars reminds us that history is a theory laden exercise and, for Vico, the full 
explanation must give the reasons why what has occurred has occurred and not just note 
the fact.  The methods of empirical history, however, might be more sophisticated than 
pure observation: one can use induction to draw out empirically verifiable theories such 
as "every revolution is followed by a period of terror".  Again, though, Vico wants more 
than a mere explanatory law, he wants the reason why what occurred occurred, not just 
that it more often than not follows such a course. 
Vico's model is unsurprisingly hermeneutical: it combines a theoretical approach 
(ideal eternal history and the knowledge one can deduce about men) with empirical 
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revision of the ideal theory.  One uses the structure of ideal eternal history as the horizon 
of one's understanding to bring one's comprehension of others into line with how they 
see themselves and the world.  His science generates new knowledge of the actualities of 
which we, the knowing subjects, are ourselves the authors, agents endowed with 
motivations.  It is a science of historical agency. (Berlin, 2000, 41) Induction for Vico is 
the humanist account of induction: it is the creation of universal in order to structure the 
world, not the discovery of them inherent in the facts of reality.8   
So, how does the hermeneutical account of the philosophy of history operate?  
When we ask “Why did x Φ?”, we presuppose that (i) x, like us, is an agent and this 
formal, abstract reduction makes understanding possible.  X will act to achieve goals and 
to further what he believes to be the good, and he will justify what he does in terms of 
reasons which can be made intelligible to us; and (ii) the substantive content of these 
reasons and these goods may well be very different from those that we ourselves hold to 
be good reasons.  X's motivations depend on his way of life and its central beliefs and 
values and philology will make us familiar with these.  So, history involves three steps: (1) 
I generate and propose categories of understanding, drawn from my own experience and 
believed relevant to the object in hand (imagination or “induction”); (2) I interrogate the 
historical object before me and reflexively ask whether these concepts render the object 
intelligible or do these concepts need to be revised; and (3) given what I have learnt I 
revise these categories in order to disclose a better understanding of the agent involved in 
the object. 
So, what role does ideal eternal history play in Vico's system and can it supply the 
ground for normative critique?  Ideal eternal history is the path that societies would 
follow if the situation and context of their rise and fall were merely theoretical.  It plays 
much the same role as the Newton’s theory of motion plays in falling balls: if there were 
no wind, no other forces, et cetera, then the ball would fall like this.  Similarly, a society 
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would follow the path of ideal eternal history, but empirical contingencies (geography of 
a country, meetings with other peoples, disasters, geology of the land, and so on) also 
play a role.  History is knowledge that requires the combination of metaphysical 
narration (ideal eternal history) and empirical narration to do with causes in the world 
(NS3 ¶¶349-350).  Ideal eternal history is a regulative element that describes the perfect 
manifestation of a certain stage of history and is a formal requirement for an accurate 
description of historical agency. 
Let us return to the normative version of the social thesis: a society is justified or 
legitimate if it makes worthwhile lives possible.  How do we tell which lives are 
worthwhile?  That depends upon the substantive content of the good which is relevant 
and appropriate to the agent, class or epoch in hand.  We need to regulate this by firstly 
determining the phase of history which is relevant.  A good society is one which satisfies 
the human being’s desire to order the world (ingenuity), to form social structures (the 
three institutions) and to live according to laws (common sense).  Formally a society to 
be a society must meet these requirements, but substantially (what good constitutes a 
worthwhile life) a society cannot appeal to universal human nature, but to the norms 
applicable to its phase of history.  So, given the table (figure 1), one can extrapolate the 
appropriate virtues and vices of a worthwhile life depending upon the relevant stage of 
history.9 
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             Social 
                  form 
Age 
Nature of one’s 
political leaders 
 
Justification of 
Laws 
Form of 
Government 
Authority/ 
Political 
obligation 
Of gods The favoured or 
envoys of the gods 
Divine right Theocratic Divine  awe 
 
Of heroes Nobles believed to be 
descended from gods 
Might is right 
(tinged with 
divine authority) 
Aristocratic Militaristic form 
of obligations – 
strict obedience 
to the law 
 
Of men Human: reasonable 
and accountable to law 
Human reason 
and duties 
Democratic Trust placed in 
people who 
represent my 
needs and my 
intelligence 
Figure 1: Vico’s sequence of the ages 
So, what is the role of the social critic on this model?  How can one say that this 
social practice should or should not be tolerated?  There are two roles as I see it: (1) to 
remind us that interference in other cultures and societies cannot be on our own terms, 
but must be on theirs (that is, values consistent with their way of life) if we are to respect 
their self-understanding.  Given the above discussion, though, there is also a further 
normative claim: (2) to ensure that the laws and institutions of one’s own way of life are 
consistent with the ideal of one’s phase of history.  The notion of human rights cannot 
be used to evaluate the actions of Homeric characters just as the motivation for heroic 
glory cannot justify actions of our contemporaries.  And when the values of legitimation 
are at odds with the institutions of a specific time, normative evaluation becomes 
possible in the relativistic sense of “one ought (not) to Φ in such and such a 
culture/society/context.”.  Revolution may well be permissible when the phase of history 
is changing and values are out of time.   
For example, one could describe the English civil war and the succeeding years 
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until the Glorious Revolution (with the correlate theoretical works) as an attempt to 
throw off the yoke of outdated legitimation practices, that is the divine right of kings and 
traditional natural law, with more modern contract models.  In figure 1, it is clear that 
such an explanation would in many ways mirror the change from the age of heroes to the 
democratic age of men.  And, alternatively, civil disobedience may be permissible when 
particular laws and social practices do not reflect the ideal phase of history.  So, the civil 
rights movements of the twentieth century were an attempt to express the agreed and 
substantial value of equality.  As a central value, equality was taken as a given for and 
appropriate to the social structures and arrangements of that century but was not actually 
instantiated in practices and institutions.   
So, we have a political norm applicable to all societies: evaluation of the 
institutions and practices of a society ought to be historically appropriate.  Prior to the 
rejection of this picture – or at least the recognition that, as it stands, it is incomplete as a 
possible normative account – one ought to say what is advantageous about it.  First and 
foremost, it seems to offer a theoretical framework from which one can justify the 
vernacular intuition often offered by people against internationalist intervention.  When 
countries use military force in the name of liberty or democracy, or when economic aid is 
tied to conditions of free trade, one inevitably hears voices of differing levels of 
articulacy protesting.  From "they are not ready for it yet," via "it is not consistent with 
their own way of life" and "the material conditions are not yet in place" to the most rabid 
"pure and simple cultural imperialism."  These intuitions can now be justified by an 
underlying theory.  The benefits of this model include, one, the refusal of cultural 
imperialism that seeks to impose capitalism or democracy on societies that just aren’t 
ready (to put it colloquially); two, a deep justification of the genealogical critiques of 
Western values with the consequent disclosure of a genetic fallacy if these values are held 
to be objective or universal and normatively applied; and, three, a theoretical but non-
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metaphysical justification of the social thesis.  Moreover, and this is what separates it 
from mere descriptive accounts, it also sets normative and rational limits to proper 
critique in terms of historical context.   
Such benefits are far too costly, however, and if this were to be the be all and end 
all of a Vichian normative political theory, it would be extremely undesirable.  Take, for 
example, the controversial social practices of human sacrifice and female circumcision.  
It is arguable that these practices can be justified in terms appropriate to their stage of 
history and hence, on this picture, be legitimate.  Human sacrifice and female 
circumcision would be quite legitimate in the age of gods, where laws are justified by 
divinity and ratified by oracles.  And such a conclusion is surely counter-intuitive: we 
would desire to interfere in such practices but this would violate the norms of our theory.  
The only resolution is to reject the theory itself as undesirable. Such cases involves a 
collision of epochs of history and the theory presented above seems to advocate an 
apartheid of civilisations.  The consequences of such would be an unacceptable quietism 
in the face of aspects such as gender inequality in other phases of history and a complete 
inability to deal with one of the most pressing problems of contemporary political 
philosophy, viz. conflict of values within conditions of pluralism.  
Such a discussion has not been in vain, though.  Taken on its own, the preceding 
historical account of normativity is not complete.  It does, however, supply criteria for 
distinguishing between good and bad philology and brings us nearer to understanding 
alien cultures.  In order to understand the substantial account of good embodied in a 
society, one needs to identify its grounding historical stage.  But, in order to criticise 
social practices such as human sacrifice and female circumcision, a further normative axis 
is required. 
5| Possible reconstruction of a Vichian normative theory 2: 
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historical naturalism 
A clue may well lie in the considerations of when one can protest or seek to 
change a law or institution and when one can bring about revolution.  In the former case 
of protest, the aim is to conserve the institutions and practices of society when the values 
which ground society are not substantiated; in the latter revolutionary case, the aim is to 
change the institutions and practices of society because the values which used to 
legitimate practices no longer “speak” to the people.  The underlying reason is oddly 
familiar in both cases.  The aim is to keep society stable, either directly by enforcing 
those values the state promotes; or indirectly by demanding the substantiation of those 
values the state ought to promote.  When one's political arrangements can no longer be 
legitimated by outdated values, then the people will demand new justifications of the 
authority of the rulers and if these are not forthcoming, they will reject the structures as it 
stands, leading to instability.  Alternatively, when social practices do not live up to the 
values and norms of public culture, then the people will see it as unjust and demand 
change.  Again, if their call is not heeded, the state loses its authority and this will lead to 
instability.  (It is interesting to note that stability is the reason Vico dismisses Epicurean 
accounts of political authority and, by extension, utilitarianism.) (NS1 ¶12) 
We can now see that when the values of one's society are not substantiated in its 
institutions or practices, or when the dominant values of the public political culture no 
longer reflect the "voice" of the people, then change is desirable.  Change is desirable in 
order to avoid instability.  Yet, stability cannot be a good in itself since, intuitively, 
tyrannical and oppressive yet stable societies are undesirable.  So, why is stability for the 
right reasons (thus excluding oppression and tyranny) a good? 
Vico's opponents, of course, had an answer: stability is good since under 
conditions of stability, the individual is able to secure his or her property in Locke's 
broad sense.  A stable society is better than an unstable one because it secures and 
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protects the liberty and property of individuals.  However, such a liberal statement is not 
consistent with Vichian thought for two reasons.10  First, he would be guilty of 
introducing a metaphysical description of human nature into his thought that, without 
further elaboration, would be guilty of the "conceit of scholars".  And, second, such an 
introduction of basic desires would lead to a familiar (but inferior) contract model of 
political legitimation. 
The aim of this argument is to retain the advantages of historical normativity (the 
justification of the role of the social thesis in explanation, the recognition of the social 
thesis as problematic for any universal, substantive normative claims, and the norm of 
historical appropriateness) without committing social criticism to the worst excesses of 
relativism (irrationalism, quietism in the face of historically appropriate yet intuitively 
undesirable social practices and the inability to evaluate inter-culturally and inter-
historically).  The contract theorist does so through the postulation of substantive 
desires, but such a universal description of the human being is a metaphysical error for 
Vico. 
Let us take a few steps back to an earlier claim by Vico: human beings have a 
universal common sense that predisposes them to law-regulated behaviour.  These laws 
can be characterised as the laws of a class, of a people, of a nation but also of “the entire 
human race”. (NS3 ¶142)  In other words, there are values which are operative in our 
practical reason that appeal to one’s identity not only as a member of a specific class, nor 
only as a member of a specific society nor people, but also and above these as a member 
of the human race.  What here is meant by value?  I propose what I assume to be a rather 
uncontroversial and minimal description of a value when I assert that values are 
motivations worth having. (Wolf, 1993)   Take, for example, that when my village is 
attacked, I have the simultaneous desires to flee and to fight.  The value here is that 
desire which one desires to act upon when faced with these drives pulling in opposite 
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directions and the hierarchy can be explained rationally.  So, I desire to flee the invaders, 
but I also desire to protect my family and my staying and fighting is rationally connected 
to this second consideration.  The second desire is privileged, that is, it is the one which I 
ought to act upon, because the web of meanings that constitute my society propose the 
values of family, honour and heroism. 
Put like this, it is clear to see how such values can be social productions 
corresponding to the anti-realist relativism of Vico’s picture.  Heroism and honour rely 
upon a specific society, a specific division of labour in the family and specific social 
meanings for their value.  However, what would the nature of values which are operative 
on the whole human race be?  There are two possible candidates for universal values in 
this sense, as I see it. One, values which are universal are objectively true values 
understood in terms of moral realism or universal coherentism.  The value of respect, for 
example, may be held up as a universal value which acts as a binding motivation in the 
subjective set of all human agents because the statement “it is right (or good) to respect 
others” is truth-apt.  Morally real values trump both subjective and cultural values in the 
motivational set.  We, fortunately, need not delve into the complexities or merits of such 
a position since it is so clearly at odds Vico’s own position.  Such values would depend 
on a metaphysical picture beyond the ken of the human being and Vico has already 
dismissed such a position in his consideration of natural law theory.   
Two, these values may reside in a universal account of human nature, so we 
might want to return to naturalism and empirical facts about human beings.  However, is 
this not also a return to some metaphysical description of the human being?  The answer 
is both yes and no.  We do not directly describe the nature of human beings as 
characteristic of the social contract tradition, that is we do not reduce human beings to 
atoms or simple entities within our metaphysical worldviews, but approach the question 
of human existence through the hermeneutical enterprise of philology.  The aim is to 
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find in what institutions all men agreed and through these to postulate certain formal 
motivations characteristic of human beings in opposition to non-social animals.   If one 
interrogates social existence to find a commonality between men that explains the 
existence of society and hence the universal aspect of social existence, then this is not a 
metaphysical error.  In modern parlance, top-down approaches lead to errors (using the 
concepts of our worldview will corrupt the understanding), whereas bottom-up 
approaches are to be encouraged (where the universal arises from consideration of 
difference).  The difference lies in the fact that these social contract theorists sought to 
use the account of human nature to derive substantive structures and arrangements for 
the state.  Vico uses human nature in a minimal sense. 
Vico’s notion of society is an odd synthesis of traditional views.  Like Aristotle 
(and Hegel), Vico does not think human beings can exist independently from a social 
order, but like Hobbes, Locke and the social contract tradition, he sees society as an 
artificial and not a natural entity.  To put it simply, society is a man-made object, but is 
necessary for a certain species of animal to become human through the re-channelling 
and redirection of desires and passions into the creation of a moral, socially adjusted 
being.  Society begins with an imaginative leap and the invention of a religion; the ideas, 
rituals and practices of which form the basis of social living and the substantive dictates 
of practical reason.  This initial imaginative leap creates the basic axioms (“credible 
impossibles”) of one’s practical reason and substantiates them in institutions, a 
conception of the good and a web of social values and meanings.  Society is artificial, in 
the barest sense of being made by man, but its creation is not motivated by reason but 
emotion, first amongst all, fear and this non-rational birth will express certain 
motivations common to all men in shared institutions.  The error is to turn our modern 
concepts back on their non-rational origins, rather than to let the non-rational origins 
narrate how our modern concepts came about. 
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Does this, then, give us any hope in a naturalism of values?  The commonality of 
humanity is represented, as we have seen, by three universal institutions: religion, 
marriage and respect for the dead.  These in turn represent that the fact that humans qua 
humans will have a basic web of beliefs about creation, purpose and the intelligibility of 
the universe (religion, science, metaphysics), they will have basic divisions of roles and 
responsibilities and a interlaced hierarchy of obligations and duties (family and class 
structures), and also they will see death as, in some sense, intrinsically significant in the 
life of the community as a whole and to the individuals who constitute that community 
(rites of death, sanctity of human life, the intrinsic worth of human life, a system of 
rights, et cetera).  Conjecturally it seems that human beings have a predisposition to law-
regulated behaviour motivated by the need to dominate what is unknown to them and 
have a universal desire to die in their own fashion, in a way consistent with the meanings 
of their society.  The natural facts of human beings are that death is significant and 
society, with its roles and responsibilities, is necessary.  At base, then, humans fear 
meaningless death and want to live well.  So far, so Hobbes.  Such a claim, however, is 
formal and empty until the philology of a specific society tells us what it is to live well 
and what a meaningful death would consist of.  Hobbes’s mistake (and that of most 
social contract thinkers) is to seek simple substantial natural desires.  Vico, in contrast, 
holds that it is society that supplies the substance to desires and human nature that gives 
them their formal structure alone. (Verene, 1988, 9)  
If one is to imagine what life would be like for a human at a specific historical 
time, then one must firstly recognise that in order to be a human he or she must be 
moulded by those primitive institutions necessary for social living, that is marriage, the 
rites of death and religion which reflect the natural conditions of human existence.  To 
imagine outside these is to imagine a being which is not human.  And to comprehend the 
particular nature of a culture, one must look at the actual form of its myths, institutions 
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and language in order to understand its view of the world and the agent’s own 
understanding of his roles, duties and obligations.11 
Remember that for a full explanation of a phenomenon, that “causes” of it can 
only be known if the object of knowledge is a creation of humankind.  Such an 
explanation will not only involve the how and when of an object but, most importantly, 
the why.  Why is understood as for what reason, a purposive non-modern form of 
causality.  Since societies are artificial, that is inventions of men’s actions, then their 
wherefore can be known to us.  The creation of societies is an expression of fundamental 
universal desires in human beings.  One associates in societies for reasons of security, for 
the preservation of the family, for protection from meaningless harm and death. (NS3 
¶347)  However, we ought to be careful, because such considerations in a Vichian picture 
are too minimal to do substantial work (as they would for Hobbes or any other rational 
naturalist).  What constitutes security is always to be understood substantially in social 
terms and will change from society to society.  Harm and death are permissible for other 
reasons, “bloody” good reasons, but what constitutes “bloody” good reasons is a social 
matter, what in contemporary ethics is often brushed over with the non-committal “get 
out of gaol free card” of “all things being equal.”  The good is variable (unlike Hobbes 
who goes for the lowest common denominator).  Hence a society is a good society if it 
sets the limits and values that make meaningful lives possible, supplies a given structure 
of social relations in which the individual can recognise himself as a constitute part and 
satisfies the grounding reasons for the association of individuals.   
On this picture, normativity arises in response to two questions: one, is this social 
practice consistent with one’s way of life? And, two, does it violate the basic needs of an 
individual?  The two axes of our new normative social thesis are: a society, characterised 
as a web of meanings, values and concepts, is legitimate if (1) it can justify its institutions 
and practices to its own members in terms of publicly shared values (it is historically 
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appropriate); and (2) can also demonstrate that the institutions and practices do not 
violate the basic needs which ground the invention of all human societies (minimal 
naturalism). 
Vico holds that the commonality of humanity is found in his social existence as 
constrained by a minimal naturalism and, so, he grounds his historical science in the 
faculty of imagination regulated by basic universal facts about human beings. It seems 
that, at base, the aspect of universality for political judgements is to be grounded in 
naturalism, but Hobbes’s project, which sought to unite ethics with self-regarding reason 
to generate political norms, reduced human beings to asocial, atomistic bundles of 
desires that are too simple to explain the multifaceted variety of social behaviour.  For 
Vico, naturalism constrains the faculty of imagination which produces the foundations 
for substantive judgements of reason only indirectly.  Hobbesian rational naturalism is 
too restrictive since it begins and ends with reason alone: all men want welfare, that is the 
maximal satisfaction of desires.  However, this underdetermines the possible constitution 
of welfare and has the consequence of oversimplifying sociology by not supplying the 
necessary concepts for a full understanding of human behaviour.  Humans often sacrifice 
their own felicity, and that of their families, for other social goods, and unless one can 
understand the nature of these sacrifices, sociology as a science remains incomplete.  The 
basic needs and desires of humans can be satisfied and manifested in a myriad ways 
depending on one’s worldview. 
The philological-philosophical method is indirectly grounded in a minimal 
naturalism because the faculty of imagination is constrained by these considerations in 
the production of possible social worlds.  A reflective attitude to one’s social practices 
and mores will disclose their contingent grounding in an imaginative creation of a 
possible way to exist humanly.  Such a minimal naturalism when applied to the issue of 
conflict demands that for a social fabric to fulfil its role, then it must embody the human 
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commitments to the value of life, the significance of death, the goodness of security, the 
rightness of law, the badness of unnecessary pain, and so on.  And, more importantly, 
the violation, repression or contradiction of any of these requires justification which 
appeals to central values of the tradition, the grounding myth.  Any society which 
engages in violating practices is either illegitimate or needs to offer a “bloody good 
reason” for the violation. 
So, in short, here is the final proposal for Vichian normative political theory.  
The legitimacy of the institutions of a particular state are to be evaluated along two axes: 
one, are the institutions legitimated immanently by those historical values and norms 
understood from the point of view of the agents who belong to that tradition (historical 
appropriateness); and two, is the understanding of the agents corrupted and are their 
basic needs and interests violated by the social structure (minimal naturalism).  Such a 
normative theory holds good to the observation of the social thesis and seemingly does 
not invoke a controversial metaphysical account for the justification of its normativity.   
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Notes: 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 It is one which I shall have to deal with in the future and it will come as little 
surprise that I do hold that the reconstruction I offer here is consistent with the Vichian 
project and his central ideas.  There is a further problem with Vichian reconstructions 
and anachronism, though, that bears mentioning.  Given the interpretative constraint 
(“the conceit of scholars”) whereby we tend to understand everything immediately in 
terms of what is familiar, the use of contemporary language may generate very real errors 
in reading his work.  I hope that this has been avoided here. 
2 This comment is, of course, a mere rhetorical hook, it is made into a substantial 
point in the words that follow.  One, however, need only look at the development of 
liberal accounts of political legitimacy from the universal truth of natural rights in Locke 
through to the political liberalism of Rawls to have an experience of the shying away 
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from substantial claims about the value of liberal “goods”. 
3 Beluval (1969) suggests that Vico was not familiar with the writings of 
Descartes himself, but aimed his critique at him though Cartesians such as Pascal, 
Malebranche and Spinzoa.  The translation of la vera as ‘intelligible’ rather than the more 
literal ‘true’ follows the suggestions of Fisch (1969). 
4 Hence Berlin’s (2000, 41-57) interpretation of the importance of the imaginative 
faculty, or the hermeneutical method by which the historian understands the world as the 
people of the time must have understood it. 
5 Abbreviations to the works of Vico are given at the end in the bibliography. 
6 Of course, such criticisms of the Cartesian project depend upon the verum-factum 
principle and it is possible that the rationalist might just deny the cogency of that 
assumption. 
7 Such a claim is consistent with Jürgen Habermas’s (1984, 1:1, iv) evaluation of 
hermeneutics in general. 
8 Boccaccio in his Genealogia Deorum proposes a theory of induction that does not 
move from multiplicity to common property, but one which expresses a common 
property in order to give meaning to the multiplicity (poetic expression).  For Vico’s 
relation to humanism, see Grassi (1990). 
9 Vico describes only three ages.  Empirically, there may be more than three, but 
I here don’t consider alternatives. 
10 Although, Caporali (1992) demonstrates that in Vico's earlier work two basic 
human needs (liberty and preservation) founded a positive normative appraisal of and an 
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admiration for the Roman Republic. 
11 The position advocated here is replicated in the thought of Hampshire: “The 
two elements in procedural justice - a universal rational requirement of two-sidedness 
and respect for locally established and familiar rules of procedure - are linked as two 
natural needs in our minds in their practical and political workings.   If either the rational 
requirement or the respect for custom breaks down and ceases to operate, we should 
expect catastrophe.  Conflict will then no longer be resolved within the political domain 
but will be resolved by violence or the threat of violence, and life will become nasty, 
brutish, and short.  Whatever one’s conception of the good, such anarchy will generally 
be reckoned a great evil, alongside starvation and near-starvation, disease, imprisonment, 
slavery, and humiliation.” (1999, 91-92) 
